Language and Wallace's problem [Review of the books More than nature needs: Language, mind and evolution by D. Bickerton and A natural history of human thinking by M. Tomasello] by Levinson, S.

























lfred Russel Wallace, who with Dar-
win gave us the foundations of evo-
lutionary theory, despaired of the 
power of natural selection to explain 
the intellectual and technological 
prowess of humans: “Natural selec-
tion could only have endowed the savage 
with a brain a little superior to that of an 
ape,” he noted ( 1), pointing to intellectual, 
linguistic, and technological capabilities 
way beyond what would seem required for 
survival. What kind of improbable course of 
events yielded this excess of competences? 
In his wide-ranging More Than Nature 
Needs, Derek Bickerton takes this problem 
as the starting point for a novel inquiry into 
the evolution of language.
Bickerton dismisses many current ap-
proaches to the evolution of language with 
trenchant arguments. He contends that 
a standard comparative approach is mis-
placed: human prowess is not to be ac-
counted for by the accumulation of elements 
exhibited among the apes or elsewhere 
in primates. Rather, extraordinary com-
petences required extraordinary selective 
pressures, best understood by searching for 
analogies far away in phylogenetic space, 
like the signaling of pollen sources by bees. 
Bickerton suggests that the special pressure 
was a climate-induced switch to cooperative 
scavenging, which required a spatial signal 
system similar to that of the bees but more 
flexible about food types. Well over a million 
years ago, this “displacement” of message 
content from the here-and-now limitations 
typical of animal communication gave rise 
to “protolanguage,” an unstructured string 
of wordlike symbols. That in turn provided a 
stimulus for brain reorganization, enabling 
the hierarchical organization of strings 
of words—the simple syntactic organiza-
tion that Bickerton, like Chomsky, thinks 
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is the essence of linguistic capacity. He 
assembles evidence for the nature of this 
core syntax from a wide range of sources, 
but especially from the structure of creoles, 
the stripped-down languages on which he is 
an expert. [Curiously, he ignores recent work 
on new sign languages ( 2) and “home sign” 
( 3) that might have been better grist for his 
mill.] Unlike most of Chomsky’s followers, 
however, Bickerton thinks the great com-
plexity and diversity of modern languages is 
due wholly to cultural history.
A book this wide-ranging—surveying lin-
guistic, developmental, evolutionary, and 
brain research—is bound to upset specialists, 
who will find fault with much detail. Neither 
the Chomskyans nor the functional linguists 
are likely to be happy with Bickerton’s solu-
tion: His version of a minimal nativist syntax 
has no place for the elaborate structures be-
loved of the generativists, while it remains 
stubbornly at odds with the psycholinguistic 
facts that he correctly thinks should be cen-
tral to the picture. (For example, language 
production is incremental and involves 
left-to-right processing, not the bottom-up 
merging of units that he favors.)
But the way that the problem is set up 
and the directions chosen for seeking 
solutions is deeply thought-provoking. 
Wallace’s problem, Bickerton points out, 
is that humans went beyond an adequate, 
simple protolanguage. There must have 
been something inevitable about the road 
to excess once the process had begun.
Among this stimulating book’s loose 
ends, one stands out. Darwin argued both 
that an evolved capacity for thought must 
have preceded language and that language 
is partly responsible for its development 
( 4). So was it advanced cognition that made 
language possible? Or did language enable 
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our complex thinking? Bickerton wrestles 
with the same dilemma but comes down on 
the side of language enabling thought: The 
displacement of messages gave us “offline” 
thinking, and core grammar gave us the 
syntax of thought.
Here, A Natural History of Human 
Thinking makes compelling reading. 
Michael Tomasello argues that it was a 
change in the mode of thinking that opened 
the great gulf between humans and the 
other great apes and that language devel-
oped from that new mode. Like Bickerton, 
Tomasello thinks it must have taken ex-
traordinary conditions to provoke the evolu-
tion of human capacities, and he similarly 
imagines cooperative foraging as the main 
selective force. But in a reassessment of his 
earlier work, Tomasello argues that apes are 
cognitively much closer to humans than had 
been thought only a decade ago. Apes rea-
son as if using conditionals, disjunction, and 
negation; appear to use abstract representa-
tions exploited productively for inferences; 
and have advanced abilities to understand 
others’ goals. Interestingly for Bickerton’s 
argument, apes clearly think with “displace-
ment,” planning for the future (e.g., retain-
ing tools). Moreover, they are able to control 
their impulses and sustain attention, dis-
playing a level of meta-awareness roughly 
comparable to a three-year-old child. Apes 
thus behave in a “flexible, intelligent, self-
regulated way” similar to humans. The 
crucial difference is that the domains in 
which they exercise these inferences are 
largely competitive, not cooperative.
Unlike Bickerton, Tomasello thinks com-
parative psychology reveals that the cog-
nitive launch pad was already present in 
our common ancestor with the chimpan-
zees. Tomasello imagines two big steps to 
get from apelike to our mental capacities. 
The first, fully realized by perhaps 400,000 
years ago, was the evolution of joint coop-
erative action, requiring recursive “mind 
reading” to establish common goals and as-
sumptions. It also requires a reciprocity of 
perspectives in the joint enterprise and so 
a meta-analysis of the cooperative activity. 
Evidence for this stage is only indirect, but 
Tomasello argues that the cooperative abil-
ity of prelinguistic infants as young as one 
year gives us insight into our early ances-
tors, since they share the lack of elaborated 
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With the advantages of cooperatively 
shared information, this advance provided 
the niche for the development of a protolan-
guage (primarily gestural), which crucially 
added an informative mode to the ape-level 
imperative mode. Pointing plus intonation 
would soon have been supplemented with 
an open-ended system of iconic gestures and 
pantomime, allowing the depiction of the 
not-here-and-now, so exercising human spa-
tial imagination. While having structured 
strings and predicate-argument structure, 
this protolanguage lacked a developed rep-
ertoire of shared conventions.
The second giant step, prompted by in-
creasing intergroup competition, was the 
development of sanctioned group norms. 
These formed the basis for shared conven-
tions and for cross-generational transmis-
sion, thus producing the ratchet effect 
of increasing cultural complexity. Norms 
brought conformity, internalized measures 
of performance, a sense of objectivity, and 
the need for persuasive reasoning. They 
gave us social institutions and also the 
cumulative conventionalizations of lexi-
con and grammar, requiring no cognitive 
capacities special to language. Grammar 
is therefore an outcome of the normative 
domestication of the species, not the great 
catalyst to human thought that it is on Bick-
erton’s account.
The two stages seem to inevitably overlap 
(for example, a protolanguage will also rely 
on microconventions of precedence and par-
ity between sender and receiver). Still, the 
book’s great virtue is its conceptual analysis 
of the cumulative steps in cognition required 
to get us from ape to human. For empirical 
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illustration of each step, Tomasello draws 
largely on his group’s work on apes and 
children. He sees no innate program for the 
development of all these cognitive, cultural, 
and linguistic skills, but rather the coopera-
tive predisposition to construct them.
So here are two alternative solutions 
to Wallace’s problem: the acquisition of a 
powerful mental algorithm as a side effect 
of acquiring the capacity for symbolic com-
munication, or the fundamental switch to-
ward cooperative motivations and the deep 
recursive computations required for joint 
action, which then provided the basis for 
language. Bickerton’s account actually pre-
supposes something like Tomasello’s funda-
mental cooperative turn of mind. But can 
Tomasello’s account stand alone? Can gram-
mar emerge just from cooperative conven-
tions for communication, through the slow 
cultural acquisition of constructions? How 
can we account for the specialized neural 
circuitry associated with language, e.g., the 
extended wiring of the arcuate fasciculus, 
which connects Broca’s and Wernicke’s ar-
eas ( 5)? Tomasello’s explanation seems to 
need extension.
For one, both books neglect speech. Hu-
mans are almost unique among the primates 
in our ability to mimic whatever sound we 
hear. We have developed an elaborate vocal 
apparatus, with reconfigured vocal tract, 
and greatly enhanced voluntary neural 
control of the tract and breathing that ani-
mates it ( 6). Modern human language use is 
multimodal, with speech, gesture, face, and 
gaze all involved, and the roots of this sys-
tem must be ancient ( 7). The generation of 
messages in such a system is part of the ac-
tion system, and many commentators have 
thought that the origins of hierarchical, re-
cursive syntax can be found in action ( 8). To-
masello’s emphasis on joint action and the 
recursive propositional thinking that lies 
behind it makes this all the more plausible 
( 9) and has the advantage of making some 
evolutionary connection between our tech-
nological intelligence and linguistic abili-
ties. Current linguistic opinion is divided on 
whether, as Bickerton assumes, something 
extra, more specifically grammatical, is part 
of our native endowment.
Oddly, neither book engages seriously with 
the new data from paleontology, archaeol-
ogy, and ancient DNA. The development 
of the vocal tract, the control of breathing, 
and fast input-output mapping (in which 
the gene FOXP2 seems to play a role) can all 
be traced in the archaeological record ( 10). 
Despite some skepticism about the evidence 
( 11), it seems probable that our vocal skills 
evolved much earlier than either author 
imagines, and they are likely to have had a 
causal role in all the other developments.
Darwin described language as “an in-
stinctive tendency to acquire an art” ( 4). 
Neither book fully captures Darwin’s in-
sight—although Tomasello comes close—
because both concentrate on the “cold” 
abstract cognitive prerequisites rather than 
the “hot” motivational and interactional in-
stincts that lie behind the strongly univer-
sal patterns of multimodal communication 
( 12). Nonetheless, both books are highly 
stimulating, especially in conjunction. ■ 
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